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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5112
The paper discusses the main features that distinguish 
inter-firm international trade finance from alternative 
sources of financing. On the one hand, inter-firm trade 
finance could help overcome informational problems 
associated with other lending relationships; on the 
other, it may contribute to propagate shocks due to the 
interconnection among firms along credit chains. The 
paper evaluates the potential effects of a financial crisis on 
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economic crisis in the context of the G20 initiative. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
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the use of trade credit for firms operating in developing 
countries. It argues that while the advantages of trade 
credit might remain largely unexploited due to poor 
legal institutions, the disadvantages might be exacerbated 
because of these firms’ greater exposure to a default chain. 
Based on these arguments, a menu of choices is identified 
for what policymakers can do to boost firms’ access to 
inter-firm trade finance in times of crisis. 
Inter-Firm Trade Finance  





Anna Maria C. Menichini
 
 
Università di Salerno and CSEF 
 
 
                                                 
 I am grateful to Jean-Pierre Chauffour, Thomas Farole, and Leora Klapper for valuable comments and 
suggestions. I bear sole responsibility for any error.  
Address for correspondence: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno, 




The severe recession that is hitting the global economy, with very low or even 
negative growth rates, has caused widespread contractions in international trade, both 
in developed and developing countries. World Trade Organization (WTO) has 
forecast that exports will decline by roughly 9% in volume terms in 2009 due to the 
collapse in global demand brought on by the biggest economic downturn in decades. 
The contraction in developed countries will be particularly severe with exports falling 
by 10%. In developing countries, which account for one-third of world trade, exports 
will shrink by some 2% to 3% in 2009.  
 
The contraction in international trade has been accompanied by a sharp decline in the 
availability of trade finance. This decline is only partly explained by the contraction 
in demand: according to a BAFT (Banker’s Association for Trade and Finance) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) joint survey (2009), flows of trade finance to 
developed countries have fallen by 6% relative to the previous year, more than the 
reduction in trade flows, suggesting that part of the fall reflects a disruption of 
financial intermediation. The contraction in value of trade finance has also been 
accompanied by a sharp increase in its price. Fear that the decline in trade finance and 
the increase in its cost would accelerate the slowdown of world trade has triggered a 
number of government initiatives in support of trade finance (Chauffour and Farole, 
2009).  
 
The situation is especially worrisome for firms operating in developing countries 
which rely heavily on trade finance to support both their exports and imports.
1 With a 
restricted access to financing and an increased cost of financing, these firms may find 
difficulties in maintaining their production and trade activities. 
 
Trade finance refers to the methods and instruments designed to support importers 
and exporters throughout the trade cycle. Importers do not want to pay cash in 
advance for imported goods and services. Consequently exporters have to provide 
credit and secure financing until they receive payment. Moreover exporters 
themselves need to finance their own production to support their export sales.  
 
There are various ways for both exporters and importers to finance their trade cycle. 
This study focuses on inter-firm trade finance,
2 i.e. the finance provided to importers 
from exporters to buy the goods from overseas, and that provided to exporters, to help 
                                                 
1 Emerging market banks report on average a 6% decline in trade finance transactions (IMF/BAFT, 2009). 
2 The study will not address issues related to trade finance intermediated by banks per se, although this represents 
a conspicuous share of trade finance.   3
them produce the goods to export as well as to allow them to finance their extensions 
of credit to importers.  
 
This is one of the most important sources of short-term financing for firms around the 
world (Petersen and Rajan, 1997).
3 It tends to be relatively more prevalent for firms 
located in developing countries (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Beck et al., 
2008). Its use tends to increase in times of crisis (Calomiris, 1995; Love et al., 2007). 
Within the scenario described above, these three stylized facts are striking and suggest 
that a closer look should be devoted to this specific form of financing. 
 
To this aim, we will start by identifying the main features which distinguish it both 
from the financing provided by financial intermediaries and the trade financing 
intermediated by banks. 
 
We will then try to understand whether these features can shield this form of 
financing from the general credit crunch or rather constitute an extra element of 
tension, especially from the point of view of developing and low-income countries. 
Our ultimate objective will be to identify theoretical economic rationales that could 
underpin policy actions in favor of this form of financing. 
 
Firms simultaneously extend trade finance to their customers and receive it from their 
suppliers. This exposes them on one side to the risk of non-payment by their 
customers, and on the other side to the risk of credit stopping by their suppliers. 
Because of this, trade credit is considered as a mechanism of propagation of shocks. 
This risk might be stronger in countries with less developed financial markets, and 
thus in many emerging countries, which have higher proportions of their debts 
financed with trade credit. 
 
However inter-firm trade finance also presents a number of advantages that justify its 
widespread use. Unlike standard lender-borrower relationships and intermediated 
trade finance, inter-firm relationships may be characterized by less severe incentive 
problems which facilitate contract enforcement and affect both the cost and the access 
to credit. Intermediated trade finance, for example, involving several agents, is more 
prone to problems of asymmetric information relative to inter-firm finance. A letter of 
credit, for instance, involves an importer, the local issuing bank, the exporter 
confirming bank and the exporter. With several agents there are multiple incentive 
problems. Buyer’s creditworthiness is crucial for the issuing bank to be willing to 
undertake the risk. In turn the confirming bank has to be confident that the issuing 
bank has sufficient funds to extend credit to the importer. In these circumstances, it 
becomes more difficult to control and align the incentives of the various parties 
                                                 
3 According to Global Business Intelligence (GBI, 2007), a consulting firm specialised in supply chain matters, 
accounts payable and receivable represent 78% of international trade.    4
taking part in the relationship. However, reducing the number of parties involved in 
the credit relationship does not solve the problem: as will be more thoroughly 
discussed in section 3.1, a standard lender-borrower relationship still presents more 
severe incentive problems with respect to those that characterize inter-firm financing. 
 
Unlike other forms of financing, inter-firm trade credit may also be favored by the 
establishment of a relationship of trust between the trading parties, a relational type of 
contract (Gibbons, 1997). These types of relations are particularly valuable when 
contracts are largely incomplete due for example to unobservability of parties’ actions 
or unverifiability of traded goods characteristics. In these circumstances it may be 
difficult and costly to have the contract enforced by a third party. Agreements must 
therefore be enforced informally or be self-enforcing. This is achieved through 
repeated relations: parties abide by the agreements because they know that this will 
be rewarded with future business gains. Reputation becomes therefore sufficiently 
valuable that neither party wishes to renege on the deal. 
 
Strictly related with the factors that favor the establishment of long-term 
relationships, suppliers and customers might each be necessary to each other in the 
business and thus have (extra) mutual advantages from a trade relationship. For 
example, suppliers can produce specific goods which make it difficult for the 
customer to find alternative suppliers and determine a lock-in effect.  
 
Last, inter-firm trade finance may have other advantages which do nevertheless 
remain unexploited due to specific provisions of business law, or sometimes to poor 
legal institutions. The supplier might for example be more efficient than other firm’s 
creditors in liquidating the goods supplied in case of non-payment of the customer. 
However, in many bankruptcy codes trade credit is a junior claim, so that this 
advantage remains largely unexploited. 
 
Based on these features, it is possible to identify various measures to increase access 
to this form of finance. These measures should go in the direction on one side of 
creating the conditions to exploit in full its potential advantages, and on the other side 
of identifying “critical” market participants, i.e. those which are more likely to be 
exposed to market failures and/or are more likely to transmit shocks. These measures 
would include: 1. creating or improving mechanisms of information sharing; 2. 
promoting institutional reforms aimed at increasing the efficiency of the legal and 
judicial system; 3. creating the conditions for exploiting the benefits of structured 
financing schemes, especially in developing countries. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section examines some 
singularities of this form of financing which are relevant in the current credit crunch 
and briefly reviews some of the main trade finance instruments. Section 3 explores   5
the main features of inter-firm trade credit which distinguish it from other forms of 
financing. Based on these, Section 4 discusses some measures that could be taken to 
increase access to this form of finance in current circumstances. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Inter-firm trade finance in the current credit crunch 
 
As argued in the introduction, there may be several reasons that justify the reliance on 
inter-firm financing. In this section we want to highlight some potential risks involved 
in it. Since firms simultaneously take credit from their suppliers and extend credit to 
their customers, it appears on both sides of their balance sheets. Moreover, it is not 




Debtors’ lending and lack of diversification may constitute an element of great risk in 
times of crisis, particularly in the light of the increasing organization of production in 
global supply chains, i.e. in a network of different types of companies that participate 
in the production of goods and services and ultimately deliver them to the final 
consumer. Aside from the aspects concerning technology improvements and 
efficiency increasing methods, a key element in determining the competitiveness of 
each company along the chain, and ultimately of the whole chain of production, is 
related to financing. In order to guarantee themselves production orders, suppliers 
have to offer their customers attractive payment options. However, to finance their 
credit extensions, they themselves need financing, which may be extended by 
upstream suppliers or by financial intermediaries. When firms are perceived as 
potentially risky, or the financial sector is poorly developed, which is often the case 
for firms in developing countries, access to credit for weak firms in the chain may be 
difficult and costly. In these cases, firms with good credit ratings along the chain may 
act as guarantor with the financier to facilitate lending to their suppliers, or they may 
themselves step in by directly financing its working capital. One possible way to do 
this is by resorting to structured financing schemes, i.e. schemes by which an exporter 
receives lending by securitizing its assets.
5  
 
All this implies that, besides the supplying relationship, there may be strong financial 
links among the various parties interacting along a supply chain. These links may 
become particularly relevant in times of crisis, as shocks to the liquidity of some 
firms, caused by the default of the customers belonging to a sector in distress, may in 
turn cause default or postponement of debt repayments on their suppliers and 
propagate through the supply chain.  
                                                 
4 Often a large share of firms credit is represented by receivables vis-à-vis one big customer, especially for firms in 
developing countries producing for one big developed country firm.    
5 These will be better described in the following section on trade financing instruments.   6
It is no surprise, therefore, that in the current circumstances inter-firm trade finance 
becomes a particular issue of concern, especially for developing countries, and this for 
a number of reasons.  
 
First, large international companies in developed countries have increasingly 
outsourced their production to low cost sourcing markets. Disruptions in production 
may then arise if these suppliers have insufficient credit to finance the shipment of 
their production to the next stage of the chain or even to carry out production. Second, 
exports from emerging markets may highly depend on imports from developed 
country firms along the chain. A collapse in import financing may thus further depress 
emerging countries exports, thus causing further disruptions in production. In 
addition, with a large proportion of their debts financed with trade credit (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Beck et al., 2008), firms located in emerging countries 
might face stronger risks of propagation of shocks. 
  
The following section explores some distinguishing features of international trade 
finance relative to domestic trade finance and discusses some of the most used trade 
financing instruments. 
Trade financing instruments 
Any trade transaction involves a commercial risk, like the non-acceptance of goods 
by buyer or the failure of buyer to pay debt, which may be amplified within an 
international context. Moreover, international trade transactions involve an exchange 
rate risk, which firms operating in domestic countries or in single currency unions are 
protected from. Last, international transactions may involve an “infrastructure” risk, 
occurring when trading partners operate in very heterogeneous countries, with 
different financial systems or different legal systems. 
 
Various financing instruments have been designed to assist and facilitate the parties 
involved in international trade as well as mitigate the risks associated to it.  
 
Among the methods and instruments designed to effect a payment, the most 
commonly used ones are open account, collection of payment against document and 
letter of credit. These transfer the commercial risk from the exporter to the importer at 
different stages of the transaction.  
 
Among the methods used to raise capital, we may list the following: 
  Buyer’s credit. A financial institution in the exporting country extends a loan, 
directly or indirectly, to a foreign buyer to finance the purchase of goods and 
services from the exporting country, thus enabling the buyer to make payments 
due to the supplier under the contract.   7
  Leasing. This is generally used by manufacturing companies that need to import 
equipment or machinery to produce goods for export. The company procures the 
equipment and pays a monthly rental fee to a leasing company (or to a bank), 
which owns the equipment. 
  Factoring. The exporter sells its accounts receivables at a discount to a factoring 
house in exchange for immediate cash.  
  Forfaiting. The exporter offers credit terms to the importer and then sells the 
receivables to a financier in exchange for cash without recourse.
6 
  Structured financing. This scheme is generally used to provide working capital 
financing to exporters by securitizing its assets, which therefore serve as collateral 
for the loan. There are various types of structured financing schemes. With 
inventory financing, a loan is secured by inventories of raw materials or 
intermediate or finished products. It is commonly used to finance trade in 
commodities, since commodity producers and traders typically hold substantial 
inventories. With export receivables-backed financing, pre-exports loans or 
advance payment facilities are extended to an exporter, with repayment being 
obtained from the exporter’s receivables resulting from the sale of the pre-
financed exported goods. With pre-payment financing, a buyer raises a loan from 
a financier and uses it to effect pre-payment for the producer/exporter. It is 
obtained by a seller itself from its buyer in another country. The difference 
between the last two instruments is that with the latter it is the buyer that raises 
the loan from the financier to finance the producer/seller, while with the former it 
is the seller that procures the funding to finance a given export contract. 
 
It should be pointed out that schemes of structured trade financing may not always be 
viable: inadequate laws may constitute an obstacle in securing the loan, creating liens 
on assets may involve non-negligible costs, enforcing the contract, in case the loan is 
not paid out, may be costly, lengthy and unpredictable. That is why government 
guarantees are sometimes used to facilitate the use of these financing instruments and 
mitigate the underlying risks. We will explore on some of these aspects in Section 4. 
 
Among the instruments designed to mitigate the risks associated to the international 
dimension of the trade transaction we find the Export Credit Insurance (ECI) and the 
Export Credit Guarantees (ECG). With the first, the exporter protects himself against 
non-payment for his trade receivables.
7 By minimizing the risk of non-payment, it 
allows exporters to offer competitive terms to foreign buyers, increase export sales 
and increase their borrowing capacity against receivables. 
                                                 
6 Due to the non-recourse of the forfaiter in case of non-payment of the importer, this is also considered as an 
instrument to mitigate risks. 
7 It usually covers commercial risks, like the insolvency of the buyer or bankruptcy, and certain political risks such 
as war, terrorism, riots and revolution. It also covers currency inconvertibility, expropriation and changes in import 
or export regulations.   8
While ECIs protect an exporter against the risk of non-payment by a foreign buyer, 
ECGs are instruments to safeguard export-financing banks from losses that may occur 
from providing funds to exporters. Such guarantees arise because, even when trade 
financing is commercially available, banks may be reluctant to lend to firms with 
insufficient track records. Therefore, providing the banking system with financial 
guarantees for purveying export credit is an important element in helping local 
companies to export. 
 
ECIs and ECGs may be provided by Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), both private 
and governmental (such as the Exim Banks). They help promoting exports through a 
variety of activities like insuring loans made by private banks, providing various 
forms of trade financing which would be more costly or more difficult to obtain with 
pure commercial lending, generating and providing information. Recently they have 
also been involved into direct money lending. They play a very important role 
especially for developing countries exporters, which are usually small and therefore 
less able to collect information about their counterparts abroad and to get favorable 
financing terms. The greater risk premium they involve translates into greater 
financing needs, and as a result greater financing needs also for importers. By 
guaranteeing exports to developing countries, ECAs can reduce the overall financing 
needs and increase efficiency (WTO, 1999).  
 
3. Specificities of inter-firm trade finance 
 
Firms simultaneously take credit from their suppliers and provide credit to their 
customers. Thus, their balance sheet presents both financial assets (receivables from 
the customer) and liabilities (payables to the supplier). Although it may seem 
puzzling that, in the presence of specialized financial intermediaries, firms both 
receive and extend trade credit, it can be rationalized in various ways. Offering trade 
credit may be profitable because accounts receivable can be collateralized and used to 
obtain additional financing against them (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Alternatively, 
demanding trade credit may allow firms to hedge their receivables risk (Fabbri and 
Klapper, 2009). Also, it may be the result of firms having trouble collecting from 
their own customers and being forced to delay paying their suppliers (Boissay and 
Gropp, 2007).  
 
Alternative rationales stress the advantages that inter-firm credit presents over other 
forms of credit. One of these, according to some literature, lies in the fact that the 
problem of borrower opportunism that plagues any lender-borrower relationship is 
less severe with inter-firm trade finance than with other sources of financing. There 
may be two factors behind this. 
   9
First, the supplier might have private information regarding the customer’s 
creditworthiness that other financial intermediaries do not have (Biais and Gollier, 
1997). To test the information advantage hypothesis, MacMillan and Woodruff 
(1999) and Johnson et al. (2002) have studied the impact on the extension of trade 
credit of repeated business interactions and of prior information acquisition on the 
customer’s reliability. Their results seem to find support to the information advantage 
hypothesis as they show that trade credit tends to be granted when 1. supplier and 
customer have a long standing business relationship; 2. the supplier has information 
about the customer’s creditworthiness; 3. the supplier belongs to a network of similar 
firms. 
 
Another factor behind the ameliorated incentive problem of inter-firm financing has 
to do with the nature of the supplier-customer lending relationship. Unlike other 
credit relationships, this involves an exchange of goods rather than cash. Since goods 
are not as liquid as cash, defaulting on the supplier may provide limited benefits to 
the customer (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Moreover, since among the tradeable 
goods, some are less liquid than others, the benefits of defaulting may be further 
reduced. Thus, the less severe incentive problem implied by goods-lending is strictly 
related to the characteristics of traded goods. 
 
Besides providing low benefits, defaulting on the supplier may also be costly. This 
occurs when the client cannot easily and rapidly secure the same good from 
elsewhere, or when the good supplied is tailored to the needs of a single customer. 
This gives the supplier a market power in that he can threaten to stop deliveries 
should clients fail to pay and thereby enforce debt repayment better than financial 
intermediaries (Cuñat, 2007). 
 
As a result of the buyer reduced opportunism, in all the above cases suppliers are 
willing to lend more liberally.  
 
Another possible determinant of trade credit use proposed by the literature lies in the 
supplier’s better ability in liquidating the goods supplied in case of customer’s default 
(Frank and Maksimovic, 2004; Fabbri and Menichini, 2009). Whether this is a viable 
option depends again on traded goods characteristics, in that not all goods have a 
liquidation value in case of default, as well as the characteristics of the legal system. 
 
Alternative theories focus on the market structure, which may give the buyer a market 
power vis-à-vis the supplier and allows it to get better terms. Or it may be the supplier 
that, due to market power, can profit from a credit relationship with the buyer and be 
more willing to extend credit (Wilner, 2000). 
   10
Although these advantages may be significantly diluted when firms trade 
internationally, some of them may still be relevant. In particular, it is still true that 
when traded goods are very specific, there is little scope for the customer to behave 
opportunistically, even in an international context. Or that strong supplier-customer 
relationship, due either to long-term business interaction or to a difficulty in replacing 
the supplier, can also develop among firms that trade internationally. 
 
The following sections will further elaborate on some of the aspects which seem to be 
most relevant both theoretically and empirically. 
3.1 The role of traded goods characteristics 
Some of the theories briefly surveyed above imply that willingness to extend trade 
credit may be related to the characteristics of the goods traded.  
 
We identify three factors which may facilitate inter-firm credit relationships and 
which are related to those characteristics: 1. possibility of diverting the goods traded; 
2. easiness of switching to alternative suppliers; 3. traded goods collateral value. In 
order to highlight the relevance of these factors, we classify the goods into three 
broad categories; standardized goods, differentiated goods and services.  
 
Standardized goods can be used by many different customers and thus have a high 
re-sale value. Consequently, it is easy for the buyer to divert them. Moreover, due to 
their widespread use, they can be easily sold by any agent, which implies that their 
suppliers are easily replaceable. Last, they may have high liquidation value in case of 
buyer’s default, so long as they have not been transformed into finished goods.  
 
Differentiated goods are more specific and often tailored to the needs of particular 
customers, which makes more difficult for them to switch to alternative suppliers. 
Due to their specificity, they are particularly valuable in the hands of the original 
customer and, as there are fewer alternative users, they are worth more in the hands of 
the original supplier and more difficult to divert.  
 
Services  have no collateral value and are almost impossible to divert. Moreover, 
when the service provided is very specific, it may be hard to find alternative 
suppliers. 
 
From the above analysis we may deduce that, because buyer opportunism is less 
severe for firms in sectors offering differentiated goods and services (they can be less 
easily diverted and it is more costly to replace their suppliers), these firms should 
extend more trade credit (and offer better terms) to their customers than firms selling 
standardized goods (moral hazard hypothesis). Similarly, because differentiated   11
goods are worth more in the hands of the original supplier in case of buyer’s default, 
firms selling (resp. buying) differentiated goods should offer (resp. receive) more 
trade credit (liquidation hypothesis).  
 
Using a sample of small U.S. firms, Burkart et al. (2008) show that service firms as 
well as firms producing differentiated products grant more trade credit, while firms 
offering standardized goods offer less trade credit.
8 This evidence seems to provide 
support for the moral hazard hypothesis, but does not allow to clearly disentangle 
whether the driver of the results is the different diversion value of the goods or the 
different cost in switching to alternative suppliers. A direct investigation into the 
relevance of this last motivation is provided by McMillan and Woodruff (1999), who, 
based on survey data collected on a sample of Vietnamese firms,
9 show that 
customers lacking alternative suppliers receive more trade credit.  
 
As regards the collateral hypothesis, Burkart et al. (2008) provide some limited 
evidence in support of it, as firms offering differentiated goods offer more trade credit 
and firms buying a larger proportion of differentiated goods receive more trade credit. 
Also Petersen and Rajan (1997) provide evidence in support of this hypothesis, but 
they test it using the fraction of the firm’s inventory not consisting of finished goods 
as a proxy for the liquidation advantage, based on the assumption that when the 
intermediate inputs are converted into finished goods, the supplier’s liquidation 
advantage is lost. 
3.2 The role of credit chains  
One potential risk arising from the use of trade credit is that it may cause shocks to 
propagate in the economy. In a network where firms borrow from each other, a 
temporary shock to the liquidity of some firms may cause a chain reaction in which 
other firms also get in financial difficulties.
10 This has obvious implications for the 
production activity along supply chains: disruptions in production may arise if 
suppliers at any stage of the supply chain cannot finance shipment of their products to 
the next stage of the chain. The scale of the damage depends on the length of the 
credit-chain between constrained agents. In a recession such chains are longer 
because more firms suffer negative shocks to their flow of funds. However, the 
presence of firms with sufficient access to outside finance to absorb defaults without 
                                                 
8 Looking at the credit terms offered, the analysis seems to partly support the diversion hypothesis as firms in the 
service sector offer also better terms.  
9 A distinctive feature of this economy is the absence of legal enforcement of contracts. The existence of inter-firm 
credit in such a type of environment is interpreted by the authors as evidence of relational mechanisms to be in 
place. 
10 Besides transmitting shocks from customers to suppliers, trade credit may also cause shocks to propagate from 
suppliers to customers, if the former, facing liquidity problems, reduce their credit to the latter (Coricelli and 
Masten, 2004).   12
transmitting them along the supply-chain (deep pockets firms) weakens the credit-
chain propagation mechanism (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). 
 
This theory has received some empirical support. Raddatz (2008) provides evidence 
of the presence and relevance of credit-chains for the transmission and amplification 
of shocks. Boissay and Gropp (2006) find evidence in favor of the existence of trade 
credit default chains. In particular, firms that face default are themselves more likely 
to default. Liquidity shocks are transmitted along the trade credit chain until they 
reach deep pockets firms, which ultimately absorb the shock. Thus, by extending the 
maturity period of trade credit to their defaulting customers, deep pocket firms not 
only stop the propagation of the liquidity shocks, by relaxing the financial constraints 
faced by their direct customers, but also “invert” it, relaxing their customers’ 
customers financial constraints, and so on going back upwards along the supply 
chain. 
 
This suggests that there may be external effects associated to supply chain 
productions which might amplify the downsides of a credit crunch. However, if it is 
true that inter-firm trade finance is a mechanism of propagation of shocks especially 
for firms operating along supply chains, it is also true that the repeated business 
interactions among these firms may provide relevant benefits, especially during a 
financial crisis. The typical fear that lack of trust in times of extreme uncertainty may 
squeeze intermediated trade finance, exacerbating the effects of the crisis, may be less 
of a problem for firms operating along supply chains. These are often involved into 
long-term relationships and thus less likely to experience an “uncertainty driven” 
contraction in financing. Anecdotal evidence reported by practitioners
11 shows that 
the increase in the perception of risk induced by the crisis has promoted supply chain 
solutions and that supply chain finance is being increasingly used to mitigate risk and 
increase firm’s capital needs. 
 
This might also explain why trade credit is often countercyclical.
12 In times of 
recession banks are more concerned about credit risk and less willing to extend credit. 
Firms that rely more on relational contracts can increase their reliance on trade credit, 
thus making up for the higher credit risk with the relationship of trust with the 
supplier. Conversely, firms that rely on intermediated finance (formal contracts) are 
likely to be squeezed by the credit contraction, since the higher credit risk and the 
lack of a credit history, will discourage suppliers from extending them credit. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Reference in Euromoney Seminars (2009). 
12 Calomiris (1995) and Love et al. (2007) for example show that in the U.S. and emerging markets respectively 
the extension of trade credit increases during financial crisis.   13
3.3 The role of institutions 
One factor of crucial importance in determining the availability of international trade 
finance is the legal system in which trading countries operate. Inefficiency of the 
legal system, in the form of inadequate contract law or bankruptcy law, or inefficient 
judicial system, increases enforcement costs and thus commercial risk. This affects 
the cost and the availability of financing, thus hampering international trade.  
 
Which is the effect of the legal system on inter-firm credit? A number of papers 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Beck et al., 2008) find evidence that trade 
credit is relatively more prevalent in countries with worse legal institutions and lower 
investor protection. This may seem puzzling as one may expect that better legal 
institutions facilitate all types of borrowing, including trade credit. It can nevertheless 
be explained with the fact that, unlike financial intermediaries, trade creditors may be 
able to more effectively enforce contracts without resort to the legal system by 
stopping future supplies (this may be particularly relevant when the good supplied is 
specific or when it is hard to find alternative suppliers).
13 This intuition seems to be 
confirmed by Johnson et al. (2002), who, based on survey data collected in transition 
countries in 1997 for small and medium-sized manufacturing firms, find that ongoing 
relationships are more likely to be preserved when goods are complex and assets are 
specific and when it is difficult for customers to resort to alternative suppliers. 
 
According to some studies (La Porta et al., 1998), the differences in the efficiency of 
the legal system observed across countries might be related to their different legal 
origin. More precisely, countries belonging to the common law tradition are found to 
have a more efficient judicial system, and thus lower enforcement costs, as compared 
with those belonging to the civil law tradition. Djankov et al. (2003) provide an 
example of the importance of the legal system in shaping the efficiency of judicial 
systems by constructing for a variety of countries an index of procedural formalism 
of dispute resolution.
14 The authors find that judicial formalism is systematically 
greater in civil law countries than in common law countries and that higher formalism 
is a strong predictor of poorer enforceability of contracts and longer duration of 
dispute resolution.   
 
Another expression of a country’s legal system is the bankruptcy law, and debtor-
creditor law more generally. Its formal structure, actual effectiveness, length and 
practical operation differ greatly across countries. A measure of efficiency of the 
bankruptcy regimes is provided by Djankov et al. (2008) for 88 high and middle-
                                                 
13 In line with Cuñat (2007). 
14 This index is constructed describing the exact procedures used in 109 countries by litigants and courts to evict a 
tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. It measures the extent to which regulation causes 
disputes resolution to deviate from a benchmark of a third party informally resolving the dispute on fairness 
grounds.   14
income countries. The authors consider the benchmark case of a business which is 
about to default on its debt due to a temporary downturn. In such circumstances, the 
economically efficient outcome would be to turn the business over to the main 
creditor, and to let it run or sell it as a going concern. The results show that this 
efficient outcome is reached only in 36% of the countries. The cases take on average 
2.64 years to resolve with a worldwide average loss of 48% of the business’ value. 
Efficiency of debt enforcement is shaped by per capita income and legal origins. 
High-income countries and common law countries achieve higher efficiency than 
middle income and civil law countries respectively. 
 
The diversity of codes and procedures may thus introduce extra elements of 
uncertainty in the buyer-seller relationship, which parties should take into account 
when choosing trading partners and deciding whether to extend them credit. One 
recent study (Powell, 2006) provides some evidence showing that the legal origin of 
the trading countries constitutes indeed an important determinant of cross-border 
transactions. In particular, focusing on bilateral trade flows, it shows that common 
law dyads have more trade than any other dyad, namely common law-civil law dyads, 
and civil law dyads.  
 
Given the documented greater prevalence of trade credit in countries with weaker 
legal institutions and investor protection, how does uncertainty in enforcement affect 
the supply of credit to suppliers? Johnson et al. (2003) find that, although inter-firm 
credit does occur even under a poor enforcement of contracts thanks to relational 
contracts, efficient courts are nevertheless important at the start of a trading 
relationship, encouraging firms to take on new partners and thus promote future long 
lasting relationships.
15 Thus, workable courts have positive external effects since, by 
facilitating new trading relationships, they improve on relational contracting and 
boost overall productivity. This role may be even more important in times of crisis, as 
increased uncertainty may increase the perception of the risk underlying a trading 
relationship and induce suppliers to refrain from extending credit.  
 
The institutional framework plays therefore a direct role in favoring inter-firm trade 
finance. There are however alternative channels through which legal institutions may 
affect inter-firm trade finance. For example, an effective use of structured financing 
schemes, whereby the lender extends a loan to the borrower by securitizing its assets, 
or the possibility of exploiting the supplier’s better ability in liquidating the goods 
supplied and not yet transformed in case of default, may both be jeopardized by the 
poor quality of the legal system. 
 
                                                 
15 More specifically, the authors find that entrepreneurs who perceive courts to be effective grant 5% more trade 
credit on average. These results are robust to the introduction in the sample of export customers and import 
suppliers.   15
4. Implications for policy 
The analysis conducted so far has highlighted some factors that may affect the 
provision of inter-firm trade finance, trying to stress those that raise greater concern in 
times of crisis. This section will focus on some policy instruments which could be 
devised to address these concerns. 
 
4.1 Improving information sharing 
Some literature – both theoretical (Biais and Gollier, 1997) and empirical (MacMillan 
and Woodruff, 1999; Johnson et al., 2002) – has rationalized the use of trade credit 
with an information advantage the supplier has over other creditors regarding the 
buyer’s creditworthiness. This advantage may descend from existing business 
relationships or from prior investigations on the customer’s reliability, for example 
through mechanisms of information sharing.
16   
 
In a crisis scenario in which banks are more concerned about credit risk and less 
willing to extend credit, these two factors may be crucial to limit potential damage 
and prevent that the shortage in trade finance adds to the downturn in demand. In 
particular, relevant benefits may be gained from improving cross-country information 
sharing mechanisms, for example by extending public credit registries and voluntary 
exchange mechanisms to developing countries, where these systems are often still 
being designed, and promoting the sharing of this information across trading 
countries.  
4.2 Exploiting traded goods characteristics 
The discussion in Section 3.1 has confirmed that inter-firm trade financing presents 
some advantages over other lending relationships related to the characteristics of 
traded goods. These may prove important as they may suggest specific segments for 
intervention in the current credit crunch. 
 
The literature has in particular provided some empirical support for the moral hazard 
hypothesis. This predicts that firms selling (buying) standardized goods should offer 
(receive) less trade credit. The intuition is that defaulting on suppliers of these goods 
may involve low costs, as the suppliers are easy to replace, or high benefits, as the 
traded goods have high diversion value.  
 
It is therefore plausible that the problems brought about by the financial crisis be 
particularly exacerbated for these firms that are not shielded from moral hazard 
problems. Raising credit may be harder for them, more so during a financial crisis. 
                                                 
16 By acquiring information about repayment history of the customer across a range of suppliers, the seller 
increases the information on which to base its credit extension decision. Kallberg and Udell (2003) show that trade 
credit history in Dun&Bradstreet reports improves default predictions relative to financial statements alone. For 
the role and effects of information sharing in credit markets, see Jappelli and Pagano (2005, among others).   16
 
An implication of this is that different firms operating along a supply chain may 
“suffer” differently the effects of a credit crunch. Commodities, for instance, are sold 
by suppliers to manufacturers to process them in intermediate inputs or directly into 
finished goods. Having a high resale value, they can be classified as standardized 
goods. In times of crisis, suppliers of such type of goods may be reluctant to extend 
credit against them to downstream firms. Intermediate inputs, instead, tend to be 
much more customized to their intended buyers than commodities or even final goods 
and hence have a low resale value that mitigates moral hazard problems. A similar 
argument can be made for suppliers of offshore services. 
 
The consequences of a credit crunch may thus be different for different firms along 
the chain and this analysis may provide some useful indication regarding the 
candidate “weak” links along the chain. Possible ways of dealing with them are 
discussed in section 4.3. 
 
As regards the liquidation advantage, although the literature has provided some 
evidence in support of it (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Burkart et al., 2008), it is 
generally true that trade credit is a junior claim and that in an international trade 
scenario the chances for the supplier to repossess the goods supplied are extremely 
low, especially when the trading countries operate in different legal environments. 
Thus, in the absence of the ability to repossess goods, suppliers may not be willing to 
supply goods on credit and require cash payments, with a subsequent efficiency loss.  
One way to preserve this advantage would be for the supplier to secure the goods. By 
so doing, in the event of default the supplier might reclaim any good not yet 
transformed into output. This implies that not all types of good can be secured, as 
some of them can be easily hidden or diverted, and therefore subtracted from the 
bankrupt’s estate. Other goods, such as equipment or heavy machineries, may be less 
easily diverted and can thus become the object of a secured claim. 
 
The willingness to extend credit may therefore be boosted by encouraging the 
creation of liens on the goods supplied so as to avoid actions from other creditors in 
case of default. Whether this is a viable option depends of course on the specific 
provisions of the trading countries’ bankruptcy codes,
17 and on their efficiency in 
enforcing creditor’s rights (thus again on institutional factors). This issue will be 
further elaborated in section 4.4.  
                                                 
17 Several business laws do actually allow trade creditors to include specific liquidation rights in the sale contract. 
However, the degree of legal protection guaranteed to secured creditors can differ across countries. In some 
bankruptcy codes, secured creditors can enforce their contractual rights and recover the collateral outside the 
ongoing insolvency proceedings. In this way they are exempted altogether from insolvency proceedings. In other 
bankruptcy codes, secured creditors are included in the bankruptcy process, generally for a specified short period 
of time during which the administrator can either sell the firm as a going concern or sell assets piece-meal. In this 
second case, secured creditors are first in the order of priority.   17
 
 
4.3 Rejoining the “broken chains” 
One of the downsides of interfirm trade finance is that it may be a mechanism of 
propagation and amplification of shocks. However, the evidence in favor of the 
existence of trade credit default chains that stop when they reach large, liquid firms 
with access to financial markets (Boissay and Gropp, 2006) suggest that there is some 
room for intervention.  
 
In these circumstances it would be “ideal” to identify breaking points in the chain, i.e. 
firms in the chain that are more exposed to the risk of insolvency and more likely to 
start the chain of defaults - based on the discussion in section 3.1, sellers of 
commodities or of final goods - and devise interventions to prevent disruptions in the 
chain. However, depending on the type of intervention designed, a whole lot of new 
issues arise. First, it may be difficult to discriminate between a firm which is facing a 
temporary liquidity shock from one that is insolvent and for which a targeted 
intervention only postpones the decision to shut down. Moreover, moral hazard 
problems may arise in adopting schemes of financial support for vulnerable firms, as 
these might divert the financing obtained to other uses rather than strengthen the 
credit chain.  
 
A way to overcome these problems might be to design schemes aimed at extending 
the maturity period of trade credit while not challenging the financial health and on-
going viability of other firms along the supply chain, i.e. ensuring that suppliers can 
collect payment as soon as possible. For example, receivables backed finance 
programs are normally used to finance exports, allowing firms to get the receivables 
off their books and promote a greater extension of trade credit.
18 A similar scheme 
largely used to finance imports is the payables backed supplier finance, also known as 
reverse factoring, by which the buyer delegates to a bank or to other financial 
intermediaries the handling of its payables. It allows the buyer to extend payment 
terms, and suppliers to receive early payment or payment at maturity, according to 
their actual working capital needs. It can be particularly important to finance the 
working capital of risky exporting firms in emerging countries with little access to 
credit and to reduce the processing costs of the buyer who can make fewer payments 
to a single creditor, the factor, rather than various payments to multiple suppliers. The 
extension of the maturity period of trade credit that this arrangement permits would, 
at least temporarily, relax buyers’ financial constraints, and possibly allow to screen 
                                                 
18 Being off balance sheet, this financing instrument would not reduce the exporter’s existing credit limits. 
Moreover, it would allow overcoming the problems created by banks reluctance to lend against receivables, 
especially in emerging markets, when a large percentage of these is international.    18
viable firms, facing occasional liquidity shocks, from distressed ones. More 
importantly, the possibility for the supplier to receive early payment, rather than 
payment at maturity, would inject fresh liquidity in the chain and possibly absorb 
negative shocks. 
 
Some of these schemes are already effectively in use in many supply chain finance 
programs (GBI, 2007),
19 but in times of uncertainty and lack of confidence and with 
their own access to finance drying up, many financiers may be more reluctant in 
providing them. In these circumstances, the response of public-backed institutions 
may prove important to mitigate risk and encourage the implementation of such 
measures. 
 
Recently, the supply-chain finance group at the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) is attempting to boost short-term trade finance by creating a temporary 
secondary market for receivables. Programs for short-term lending of working capital 
and credit guarantees aimed at Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are being 
implemented by ECAs.
20  
4.4 Promoting institutional reforms 
The above discussions have highlighted the importance of institutional factors for the 
provision of inter-firm trade finance. By increasing uncertainty for traders, the 
existence of heterogeneous and/or inefficient institutional structures gives rise to legal 
or administrative barriers that can strongly hamper cross-border transactions. In 
particular, poor or uncertain creditors’ rights protection may limit the willingness to 
extend credit and worsen the conditions at which this is granted.  
 
The enormous cross-country variability in the index of procedural formalism 
developed by Djankov et al. (2003) witnesses the great degree of uncertainty trading 
firms may face over disputes resolution. In newly established relationships, in which 
it is not possible to base the credit extension decision on a previous credit history or 
on trust, this may discourage trading parties to extend credit altogether and jeopardize 
future potentially profitable trading relationships. This is especially harmful for 
developing countries needing export-financing or seeking to finance their imports. 
 
                                                 
19 The reverse factoring, for instance, is used in various countries by large international retailers with supermarket 
chains to support their suppliers’ cashflows, while optimizing their own working capital management. Finance is 
structured so that trade payables on the retailers’ balance sheets is classified as trade credit, rather than bank debt, 
thereby avoiding a reduction in their credit limits. Similarly, being structured as receivables purchase from the 
supplier, which is without recourse, this finance is off balance sheet for the supplier as well. It has therefore 
positive effects for both the retailers and their suppliers. 
20 Actually more frequently ECAs are doing something more than just insuring loans. The U.S. Exim Bank is 
lending money directly to non-American buyers of American products. Similar measures have been adopted also 
by other governments (France, Germany, Canada, Japan). At the last G20 meeting in London a new scheme has 
been approved that demands that agencies provide direct co-financing to banks to underwrite trade.    19
A harmonization of the rules, as well as an improvement in the efficiency of judicial 
systems, is therefore imperative to keep international trade financing going and 
possibly growing. For example, bilateral or multilateral agreements might be 
encouraged in an attempt to provide a more even playground for firms in developing 
countries seeking to export to developed countries.
21 To this aim, the Djankov et al. 
(2003) index of formalism might be used to target the countries on which to intervene. 
Although this index concerns two specific domestic disputes arising across several 
different countries, it may notwithstanding provide a qualitative assessment of the 
“distance” in terms of judicial efficiency between trading countries and inform about 
the dyads or groups of countries for which such interventions are more needed.  
 
Similarly, Djankov et al. (2008) index of efficiency of bankruptcy procedures might 
inform about the countries where bankruptcy regimes are less efficient and which 
more urgently call for reforms. This issue is clearly important per se, as a good 
bankruptcy regime maximizes the total value available to be divided between debtor 
and creditors and thus allows reducing the ex-ante cost of credit. However, the issue is 
also important for the implications that the crisis may have for corporate failures. 
From the last section, it has emerged that, especially for firms along supply chains, 
distress may have self-reinforcing effects and cause systemic defaults. There is 
therefore an issue of whether existing bankruptcy regimes can adequately deal with 
situations of this type or rather some reforms are needed to alleviate the effects of the 
crisis. The issue is taken up by Djankov (2009), who discusses a menu of possible 
reforms designed to deal with situations of distress following a crisis: the super-
priority of fresh capital, prepackaged bankruptcy, super bankruptcy. 
 
Particularly interesting in the light of the discussion on inter-firm finance as a 
mechanism of propagation of shocks is the super-priority of fresh capital. As argued 
in section 4.3, in times of crisis it is important that financing be available along the 
chain to absorb negative shocks and prevent inefficient liquidation. One possible 
solution is to reform the bankruptcy code and allow new capital to take priority over 
all old creditors, including secured ones. This gives an extra incentive to lend to 
distressed businesses allowing an injection of fresh capital in the chain. 
 
With a prepackaged bankruptcy a firm negotiates a reorganization plan with its 
creditors prior to filing for bankruptcy. Given the advance negotiation with creditors, 
a court hearing can be scheduled quickly, leading to a quick exit from bankruptcy. 
 
Another approach, so far untested, is the adoption of “super bankruptcy,” a temporary 
tool to be used when a country faces systemic bankruptcy. It consists in keeping in 
place the management, so as to exploit its better knowledge of the firm, and forcing a 
                                                 
21 It is worth to notice that letters of credit were actually introduced to deal with this problem and ensure 
enforceable contract.    20
debt-to-equity conversion, so as to prevent too many liquidations. In a systemic crisis 
this can preserve the going concern value of the firm. 
5. Conclusions 
 
The paper has focused on inter-firm international trade finance, trying to identify 
theoretical economic rationales that could underpin policy actions in favor of this 
form of financing in times of crisis, with a focus on constraints faced by developing 
countries. 
 
To this aim, it has identified some of the main features of this form of financing, 
trying to highlight the specificities that distinguish it from other sources of funding 
and understand under which circumstances they constitute an issue of concern in 
times of crisis or rather a “shield” for financially squeezed firms.   
 
It has in particular outlined three specific issues which may influence the provision of 
inter-firm credit: 1. the lower incentive problem its use may involve, due either to an 
outright information advantage or related to the characteristics of the traded goods; 2. 
the interconnection among firms along credit chains; 3. the institutional setting in 
which trading firms operate. 
 
The two main and opposing aspects that emerge from the analysis are on one side that 
inter-firm trade finance may be a way to overcome informational problems associated 
to other sources of funding; and on the other side that it may be a mechanism of 
propagation of shocks, especially in times of crisis, due to the financial links among 
firms. 
 
As far as the first aspect is concerned, it has been argued that there are circumstances 
in which the advantages of inter-firm trade finance are not fully exploited, for 
example because of poor legal institutions. As regards the second aspect, it has been 
argued that firms located in emerging countries may be more exposed to a default 
chain, due to their larger reliance on trade credit, as well as to its disruptive effects, 
because of their dependence on orders from developed firms.  
 
In these circumstances it is important to identify the market participants which are 
more likely to be exposed to market failures and/or to be at the heart of the 
transmission of shocks. Moreover, it is also important to create among the trading 
partners all the conditions to exploit the advantages of inter-firm trade finance, like 
removing the obstacles that might create inefficiencies. For example, structured 
financing schemes might be a valuable instrument to secure export financing to firms 
located in low-income countries. However, this may be turn out to be costly and   21
complicated without an efficient legal and economic environment effectively 
supporting trading partners. 
   22
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